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The Future Impact of the Security Situation in Syria on the Arab Region

Introduction:

This study addresses the most significant impacts and key implications of the security and strategic situation in Syria, particularly in relation to the political and strategic landscape of the Arab world. It anticipates various potential scenarios and developments that may unfold in the medium and long term. The ongoing developments in Syria whether positive or negative are expected to have ramifications across the Arab region. These effects extend not only to states but also to non-state actors, in addition to the possibility of intensified foreign interventions in Arab affairs, not limited to neighboring regional powers but extending to the entire Arab world.

Study Objective:

The study aims to highlight the most likely and significant repercussions originating from within Syria that could impact the regional context and overall stability or instability of the Arab world. It further seeks to emphasize how the current developments in Syria might steer the course of security and strategic arrangements being devised for the Arab world through various international approaches, whether security-related or strategic.

Methodology:

The descriptive method is one of the most prominent and essential research methodologies in scientific inquiry. It is particularly useful in studying and analyzing issues and topics of a descriptive nature that involve non-numerical information. This approach is commonly found in scientific research, especially in the social sciences. The steps involved in the descriptive method include identifying the research problem, collecting as much information

as possible about it, formulating hypotheses or questions that represent potential solutions to the problem, and then providing explanations and drawing conclusions.

Study Contents:

- 1- The current situation in Syria.
- 2- Regional developments.
- 3- The trajectory of Syrian developments and their impact on the Arab world.
- 4- Multidimensional regional impacts.

First: The Current Situation in Syria:

- 1- Syria is witnessing critical and pivotal developments, both domestically and in the context of regional and international dynamics. These are closely tied to Syria's relationships within the Arab region. The repercussions of these developments will affect not only the Syrian interior whether positively or negatively but also the broader regional transformations.



Syria and its neighboring countries, including Jordan, Gaza, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq, are significantly involved in these events, particularly in light of new policy directions introduced by the U.S. administration and President Trump's interventions in resolving issues in Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and the Arabian Gulf⁽¹⁾.

2- It can be asserted that the Syrian reality continues to follow a singular trajectory in both political and security terms. The current political scene has not changed since the fall of the previous regime and the establishment of the interim transitional administration. Political developments are tied to several crucial steps that may require further evaluation and revision over time, foremost among them being the ongoing political process and its relation to the current scene. The formation of a Syrian government, the reorganization of internal political structures, and the continuation of dialogue with internal forces remain governed by specific parameters linked to the broader Syrian political system. There are persistent calls for accelerating the political process and avoiding delays, as the situation remains hostage to potential military solutions or internal change strategies, with each party maintaining control over its areas through military power. Despite this, there is some degree of superficial flexibility in negotiations and reconsideration of positions due to internal, regional, and international pressure. Some actors are currently observing and awaiting clearer political outcomes and the Syrian public's reception of change beyond the euphoria of victory and transformation.

3- What applies to the internal situation especially regarding the Alawites also applies externally, particularly to the Russian side. It is clear that Turkey is the primary beneficiary of current developments within Syria. Turkey is operating amid complex and shifting calculations, supported by its on-the-ground presence. There is no clear vision for disengaging "Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham" from "Al-Qaeda", nor is there a definitive framework for dismantling the relationship between the interim Syrian president and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi⁽²⁾.

4- Several key issues await the Syrian administration, including:

A- President "Ahmed al-Sharaa" appointed a provisional government in Syria, composed solely of members from the "Salvation Government" aligned with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib. This government lacks representation from other political, military, social, or sectarian components, indicating an attempt by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to monopolize power in Syria. "Al-Sharaa" stated that holding elections may take up to four years, and drafting a new constitution could take three years⁽³⁾.

B- Several observations can be made regarding this government:

- Most appointed ministers come from Idlib and Aleppo provinces, which may provoke criticism from other Syrian governorates.
- The majority of appointed ministers are middle-aged, mainly between (30 and 50 years old), with fewer individuals between (50 and 63 years). Most of the ministers have academic backgrounds in scientific fields such as engineering and medicine, while others come from disciplines such as education, Islamic studies, military colleges, and political science. Their experiences reflect this diversity. Some held administrative roles under the previous Syrian regime, though not in key positions.
- The interim government was completed with the appointment of "Asaad al-Shibani" as Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Marhaf Abu Qasra" as Minister of Defense, and "Aisha Al-Dibs" as Head of the Women's Affairs Office. Several individuals were assigned to govern various Syrian provinces, including "Azzam Gharib" (known as Abu al-Ezz Muraqib) as Governor of Aleppo and "Amer al-Sheikh", leader of Ahrar al-Sham, as Governor of Rural Damascus⁽⁴⁾.

C. Integration of Armed Factions into the New Syrian Army:

Syrian President "Ahmad Al-Shara" held a meeting with military factions in Damascus on December 21, 2024, to discuss the structure of the new military institution. He affirmed that

these factions would be merged into a unified institution under the administration of the Ministry of Defense in the new army.

The meeting was attended by leaders of factions and groups representing northern, southern, and central Syria, most notably: Ahrar al-Sham Movement, the Sham Front, Suqour al-Sham, and military groups from Daraa Governorate. However, “Ahmad Al-Awda,” commander of the Turkish-backed Eighth Brigade, refused to attend the meeting despite arriving in Damascus, citing complicated procedures and the prolonged delay in allowing faction leaders to enter the meeting.

The new Syrian administration, amid concerns among other factions about the possibility of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” seeking to dominate the scene especially over factions and military groups from Daraa is working to win over these factions through various means, including:

- Appointing “Azzam Al-Gharib,” commander of the Sham Front, as governor of Aleppo, Syria’s economic capital, just one day before the meeting.
- Appointing Suqour al-Sham leader “Ahmad Issa Al-Sheikh” as governor of Idlib; Ahrar al-Sham commander “Amer Al-Sheikh” as governor of Rif Dimashq; and “Hassan Soufan,” who had helped bring factions closer to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham years ago, as deputy governor of Latakia, a key port city. “Mohammad Othman” was appointed governor of Latakia as well⁽⁵⁾.

D- Based on these developments; several observations can be made:

- The administration is attempting to win over traditional allies of “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” and persuade them to support the proposal of integrating factions under the Ministry of Defense.
- The appointments reflect a security-focused nature, resulting from the presence of Syrian Demo-cratic Forces (SDF) elements in some Aleppo neighborhoods, as well as loyalist militias and remnants of the former regime. Latakia still hosts many security and military personnel from the former army, in addition to the Russian Hmeimim Air Base.

E- The new administration has begun a broad political movement to overcome the legacy of internal conflict among Syria’s various sects and minorities, emphasizing that all groups have made sacrifices for Syria’s liberation. This was demonstrated through the following:

- Al-Shara emphasized during his meetings with Lebanese Druze leader “Walid Jumblatt” and a delegation of Druze leaders from Sweida the importance of adopting a state-oriented mindset rather than an oppositional one, and the need for national unity and a social contract that ensures social justice for all sects⁽⁶⁾.
 - During a meeting with representatives of Christian churches, there was a call to draft a modern constitution that reflects Syria’s societal diversity and ensures protection for all sects.
 - A call was made to convene a comprehensive national conference bringing together all political forces from inside and outside the country, religious sects, civil society components, social groups, armed factions, independents, and scientific experts.
 - Meetings were held with members of the Alawite sect, which the former regime belonged to, in both Damascus and Latakia, reaffirming the new administration’s commitment to societal peace.
- 5- Since the collapse of the former regime in the face of armed opposition factions, the Syrian Demo-cratic Forces have attempted to expand their control in rural Aleppo and Deir Ezzor, but later retreated following clashes with Turkish-backed National Army factions⁽⁷⁾.
- 6- The new administration is currently focusing on finalizing the structure of the Ministry of Defense under the transitional government and is conducting intensive consultations with other opposition factions, including those affiliated with the National Army and the SDF, to integrate them into the new Syrian army, based on several considerations:
- A- Resolving the issue of the strategically important northeastern areas that produce wheat and contain key oil fields such as Rmelan, Al-Omar, and Al-Jafra.



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B- Avoiding provoking the U.S. stance, especially as the new administration seeks to lift sanctions on Syria and remove the “Hay’a” (HTS) from the list of terrorist organizations.

7- Based on the above, a negotiation session was held between the new administration and the SDF to reach a consensual framework that would facilitate the integration of the SDF into the new administration. However, the SDF insisted on joining the new army as a unified bloc and demanded a major share of oil revenues for an autonomous administration resembling a federal system in Kurdish-majority areas. The new administration agreed to a form of administrative decentralization and granted the SDF a share of oil revenues proportionate to their population and geographical size, in exchange for individual integration of its members into the Syrian army under the new Ministry of Defense. They also expressed willingness to recognize Kurdish cultural rights, notably allowing the Kurdish language to be taught in schools. The discussions ended without a finalized agreement⁽⁸⁾.

8- Several points should be noted here:

A- The new administration is taking a cautious approach to finalizing an agreement with the Kurds, considering political, regional, and international developments especially following the inauguration of “Donald Trump” and is waiting to assess his foreign policy, particularly regarding Syria.

B- The significant development represented by the autonomous administration led by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), its political front (Syrian Democratic Council – MSD), and its military arm (SDF), which controls areas in four provinces across northern and eastern Syria namely Hasakah, Deir Ezzor, Raqqah, and Aleppo and its ties with the U.S. and the international coalition against ISIS.

C- The political and military challenge posed by the operations led by Ahmad Al-Shara is serious. Without political consensus or resolution of existing disputes, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army is effectively

at war with the Kurdish SDF. This landscape changed after a newly announced agreement between Syrian President Ahmad Al-Shara and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi aimed at integrating the civil and military institutions of the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria into the state apparatus. The agreement has stirred strong reactions among officials and local residents, who hope for a structured implementation through a central committee overseeing specialized subcommittees across various fields including security, military, health, education, and others with these committees expected to be operational by year’s end as outlined in the agreement⁽⁹⁾.

D- This agreement holds great importance, not only as a unifying step for Syria, but also for restoring the Kurdish component’s role in building the nation. The Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian society, bound by shared geography and history. The agreement also includes a clause for the release of some detainees from both sides before the end of Ramadan, as communicated by the political leadership in Damascus. Regarding oil resources, an agreement was reached to continue the supply of petroleum products from the Jazira region (under SDF control) to the Sham region (under government control) until expert committees submit new integration mechanisms with the Syrian government.

9- From examining these ongoing developments, it is clear that there is no strong cohesion among the factions that toppled the former regime on how to shape Syria’s post-regime future. There are also divergences in regional and international stakeholders’ visions regarding the same issue, which increases the uncertainty about how to initiate a Syrian-led comprehensive political process for a transitional phase in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, while ensuring the protection of minorities and diverse Syrian communities. The Syrian administration remains keen to reassure the Kurds and calls on them to withdraw from the areas they control in northern and eastern Syria and join the new government, in order to prevent further bloodshed.

10- In the current and potential political trajectory, the National Dialogue Conference represents a major political milestone, as it will prepare for a historic phase in Syria's post-regime life. However, patience is required, and criteria must be established for selecting participants, along with practical and executive steps through a preparatory committee and clear objectives for the conference.

11- There is a concern that international pressure may bring remnants of the former regime to the National Dialogue Conference, which could obstruct any negotiations or outcomes⁽¹⁰⁾.

To prepare for the conference, a preparatory committee of seven members organized listening sessions across the provinces. In some cases, multiple two-hour sessions were held daily to cover Syria's fourteen provinces within a week. Among the committee members were five individuals either from or closely affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. There were no representatives from the Druze or Alawite communities. The new authorities called on all armed factions, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) which had received substantial U.S. support during the years of conflict in Syria to surrender their weapons. The authorities repeatedly rejected Kurdish self-rule.

12- Syrian powers have emphasized the need to exclude foreign interference in Syrian affairs. The roles of the United Nations and the Arab League should be limited to sponsoring the dialogue conference rather than intervening in it. The same applies to other states.

13- It is exceedingly difficult to exclude foreign interference in the matter of the dialogue conference. Gulf countries, Turkey, and some European nations are expected to play roles, as these countries seek to secure economic and political interests especially since Syria needs international assistance to revive its economy and lift international sanctions⁽¹¹⁾.

14- It is clear that the current Syrian discourse is carefully studied and pre-prepared. The Syrian president presents it in a way that aims to reassure all parties, while still leaving the nature of the regime open to speculation. The United

States and Europe are still waiting to decide on lifting sanctions, including the Caesar Act. However, their preparedness for such a decision appears clear and calculated. Repeated visits by Western delegations confirm this.

15. The top priority must be institutional restructuring, including rebuilding the military and security institutions to enforce stability and prevent chaos that typically accompanies transitional periods. Armed factions and militias should be disbanded, weapons handed over to the new army, and all weapons consolidated under state control. Defected officers should be invited back into service⁽¹²⁾.

16. Parallel institutions must be dissolved, including ending the operation of multiple governments and affiliated bodies such as the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Negotiation Commission. Comprehensive political consultations should begin through a high-level political dialogue that includes all Syrian components, aiming to draft a civil constitution that ensures rights for all and guarantees equal rights and duties for all citizens.

Second: Developments in the Regional Context

1- Turkey's strategic goal is to eliminate the presence of the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), considering that they face two options: disband or face elimination by force. Turkey views Kurdish organizations in Syria as an existential threat to its national security. Turkey is not relying on current negotiations with the U.S., which may reduce support to Kurdish forces.

2- The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) face limited options in responding to pressure from both Ankara and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to disarm and transition into a political party. Simultaneously, the SDF is entangled in complex and often conflicting relationships with rival Kurdish factions. These tensions unfold against a backdrop of warnings about a potential shift toward armed confrontation a prospect increasingly evident in the form of skirmishes that are outpacing a fragile ceasefire in northeastern Syria⁽¹³⁾.



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- 3- The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have limited options remaining, with the United States being their sole significant backer. However, Turkey currently holds greater influence over the Syrian landscape. The escalating complexities in northeastern Syria risk sparking internal conflict among Kurdish factions, which have thus far failed to establish a unified framework for cooperation. Despite growing expectations that Turkey may initiate a ground operation within Kurdish-held areas in Syria, such a move would pose a significant challenge to the United States⁽¹⁴⁾.
- 4- The agreement to integrate the SDF into Syrian institutions includes eight points. The first ensures all Syrians' rights to representation and participation in political processes and state institutions based on merit, regardless of religious backgrounds. It also calls for integrating all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the transitional administration, including border crossings, airports, and oil and gas fields.
- 5- Under the agreement, the SDF will support the transitional administration in confronting what it terms "Assad remnants" and "any threats to the state's security and unity." The agreement rejects calls for division, hate speech, and attempts to sow discord among Syria's social components. Its final clause stipulates implementation by the end of the current year.
- 6- It is expected that removing Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader from terrorist lists will be a key bargaining chip for Washington to ensure the Syrian administration in Damascus aligns with its regional policies.
- 7- The main leverage held by the West especially the U.S is not just delisting groups, but also sanctions. These include sanctions not only on individuals, but also on entire sectors, including state institutions and banks.
- 8- Numerous declared conditions will remain subject to negotiation and contention between the West and the Syrian administration in Damascus. These include protecting religious, sectarian, and ethnic minorities, ensuring their rights, involving all social components in governance, preventing the persecution of women and denying them rights, and ensuring freedoms are respected.
- 9- As economic sanctions on Iran intensify, Iran may prefer to treat Turkey as a diplomatic ally against the sanctions, rather than a rival. Turkey has never supported plunging Iran's economy into crisis, and has instead preferred regional stability. Thus, Iran may view Turkey as a partner to mitigate the impact of sanctions, especially under President Trump.
- 10- Syria is not heading toward confrontation with neighboring countries or any other entity, nor is it capable of such confrontation. At that time, the Israeli military had destroyed most of Syria's military capabilities, effectively rendering Syria a demilitarized state. Nevertheless, Israeli military statements indicate that Israel does not plan to withdraw soon from territories it took over with the fall of the former regime. This will complicate relations between the new administration in Damascus and Tel Aviv, along with other regional dynamics, including Syria's relationship with regional powers such as Turkey.
- 11- Iran is considered the biggest loser in Syria's transformation. Iran still believes in its ability to influence the Syrian transition. This is evident in warnings against underestimating Iran's ability to cause instability⁽¹⁵⁾.
- 12- Turkey and Qatar are attempting to form a new regional order and a zone of influence led by the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood axis, effectively replacing the collapsed Shiite resistance axis due to Syria's removal from the equation. Turkey's presence in Syria also poses an indirect challenge to Israel, as Turkey can mobilize forces across Syrian territory, threatening Israel's borders directly or through support for militant groups hostile to Israel. This threat is further complicated by Turkey's support for extremist Islamic groups like Hamas, which Israel views as a direct national security threat⁽¹⁶⁾.
- 13- Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's plans likely include reviving the Turkish dream of turning Turkey into a hub for exporting gas to Europe. The gas pipeline from Qatar would pass through Syria into Turkey, and

then to Germany, which has already signed an agreement for importing liquefied natural gas from Qatar.

- 14- Israel faces several scenarios. One possibility is to oppose the new Syrian government, believing that the post-Assad administration may be heavily influenced by Turkey, exposing Israel to a long-term threat from a Sunni extremist axis led by Erdoğan. Another proposed scenario is recognizing the new Syrian government to influence Syria's future image and prevent absolute Turkish dominance. This aims to slow Erdoğan's efforts to establish a strategic "Erdoğan stan" on Israel's borders. However, this option also carries significant regional security risks. A third alternative may allow Israel greater control over developments, aligning with U.S. strategies in the region.
- 15- Based on these new developments, Israel is working to entrench its presence in the Syrian scene and potentially in Lebanon as well. The Israeli military intends to abandon ceasefire arrangements in Lebanon and may resume full combat operations after the 60-day ceasefire ends. Israel has hinted at this intention by conducting airstrikes deep in Lebanon's Beqaa Valley, destroying major Hezbollah arms depots said to have been recently transferred from Syria to Lebanon. Israel has affirmed that its forces will not withdraw from southern Lebanon, despite agreement stipulations⁽¹⁷⁾.
- 16- The United States may become an active partner in this initiative by reviving a "Marshall Plan" that includes rebuilding Syria and providing financial and economic support through regional and international alliances. This would allow Israel to influence the formation of a new Syria in ways that serve its long-term interests.

Third: The Course of Syrian Developments and Their Impact on the Arab Reality

- 1- Developments in the Middle East beginning with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, followed by what is termed the Arab Spring, and most recently Operation "Al-Aqsa Flood" in October 2023 and the expansion of Israeli military operations in the region have led to significant changes in the structure of some states. Armed

groups have played a major role in supporting the Israeli and Western agenda to reshape security, military, and political dynamics in the Middle East. The key manifestations of this transformation include:

- a- Creating an environment conducive to Israel's efforts to dismantle the capabilities of the Syrian army (infrastructure, weapons, and equipment), preventing the formation of a unified national army in Libya, weakening the military forces in Yemen and Sudan, and limiting the role of the military in Iraq and Lebanon ultimately excluding them from the regional balance of power.
- b- Weakening or eliminating Iran's military arms in the region particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon and the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria alongside Israeli and Western actions aimed at further weakening Iran's other proxies (such as the Houthis in Yemen and Shia factions in Iraq). These moves coincide with impactful military strikes on Iran (including targeting air defense systems and parts of the ballistic missile infrastructure), along with threats to strike Iran's nuclear and oil facilities, which have further diminished Tehran's relative regional power.
- c- The recent emphasis on portraying Israel as a dominant military and security power equipped with advanced technological capabilities that have enabled it to conduct simultaneous operations across multiple fronts and violate the sovereignty of several states in the region without encountering effective resistance has been reinforced by the inability of the international community, particularly UN-affiliated organizations, to curb these violations. This inaction is closely tied to the unwavering support Israel receives from the United States. Such dynamics may contribute to the entrenchment of a Western/Israeli strategic objective: to position Israel as the principal regional power and the sole guardian of Western interests in the Middle East⁽¹⁸⁾.
- d- The rise of regional powers benefiting from the prevailing military and security chaos most notably Turkey, which has profited from the situation in Syria and appears eager to fill the vacuum left by Iran's retreat.



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Additionally, some Gulf states have seen their roles grow in several political, security, and military domains.

2- The above confirms the functional role of armed groups in the Middle East, where they have advanced the agendas of certain regional and international powers at the expense of national interests. This has strengthened their role in dismantling state structures and dividing national unity, as they wage proxy wars on behalf of their sponsoring regional or international actors⁽¹⁹⁾.

3- In this context, several points should be noted:

- a- Arab states' outreach to the Syrian administration is driven more by security concerns than by political motives. These concerns include resolving the refugee crisis (particularly in neighboring countries), stopping drug production especially of Captagon and smuggling, combating terrorism, ending Syria's role as a safe haven for terrorists, and containing the effects of political Islam rising to power in an Arab country.
- b- There is an Arab desire to prevent Syria from falling into the orbit of regional power blocs, particularly Turkey's. This is especially relevant in light of the new Syrian administration's desire to lift international sanctions, support the Syrian economy, and contribute to reconstruction efforts.
- c- This Arab openness is likely to culminate in an invitation for Syria to reclaim its seat in the Arab League. Additionally, it is expected that there will be broad economic and commercial engagement with Syria, including contributions to energy sectors like oil, gas, and electricity. Meanwhile, armed operations against the Syrian armed forces (associated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) continue in several areas by groups loyal to the former Assad regime.

4- Ongoing Activities of ISIS: From January 28, 2024, to January 16, 2025, ISIS has claimed re-sponsibility for more than 35 attacks across various parts of Syria. These operations mainly targeted Kurdish armed factions in northern Syria and Raqqa. While the group's activity has relatively declined likely temporarily it

had spiked in late November during a period of military and security mobilization. The decline followed the fall of the Assad regime and the rise of armed factions to power, indicating that ISIS is recalibrating its priorities in anticipation of renewed security instability should the new administration fail to maintain control.

Fourth: Multi-Dimensional Impacts on the Region

1- Syrian developments suggest a growing likelihood of the following:

- a- Continued political and security fluidity in Syria in the near and medium term due to a lack of clarity on how internal affairs will be organized. President Ahmed Al-Sharaa remains firmly in power with no indication of upcoming elections. Additionally, numerous armed factions with divergent affiliations and ideologies could clash, leading to intra-group conflicts⁽²⁰⁾.
- b- Increased exploitation of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other groups opposed to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham as tools to exhaust the security and military apparatus of the new Syrian administration. These groups may also serve as pretexts for the continued American/Israeli military presence in Syria, as well as efforts to relocate or re-activate foreign fighters in coordination with Turkey to other countries in the region (such as Libya and Iraq), aligning with broader efforts to reshape regional dynamics.
- c- A possible agreement among the U.S., Turkey, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, and the Syrian Democratic Forces to grant Kurdish areas a form of autonomy similar to the Kurdish region in Iraq an arrangement reportedly already in effect at the time of writing, with guarantees to prevent any contact with Turkey's Kurdistan Workers' Party or threats to the Turkish border.
- d- Limited prospects for establishing a strong Syrian national army. Instead, lightly and moderately armed internal security and border forces are being formed under American/Israeli supervision, with a ban on heavy armament to prevent potential threats to Israel's security.

- e- Continued Israeli presence in Syrian territories in the south and potential expansion into other areas, consolidating facts on the ground amid Syria's ongoing political and security instability and the lack of international response to these incursions.
- 2- Key implications of Syria's current trajectory for Arab national security include:**
- a- Increased political and security instability in the region and a further shift in the regional balance of power in favor of non-Arab regional actors (Turkey and Israel).
 - b- The emergence of Israel as a dominant power with exclusive control over the security of the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan).
 - c- Greater likelihood of regional/international powers transferring and redeploying terrorist organizations within the region or reactivating sleeper cells (in Iraq, Yemen, and Libya), escalating security breakdowns and threatening Arab interests, most notably:
 - Continued threats to maritime navigation in the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal.
 - Negative impacts on the economic stability of the region, particularly for economically vulnerable states.
 - Increased refugee flows from states experiencing security unrest, which poses added economic and security burdens, especially considering the possibility of terrorist infiltration among refugees.
 - Expanded intervention by regional/international powers in the internal affairs of Arab states under the pretext of combating terrorism.
 - d- Difficulty establishing a unified Arab security framework to counter the rise of non-Arab regional powers due to divergent political stances among Arab states, particularly in the Gulf.
 - e- Israel exploiting the current situation to further eliminate the Palestinian cause⁽²¹⁾.

Conclusion:

It can thus be confirmed that the current and anticipated Syrian reality will have repercussions on the Arab region, especially with the growing functional role of armed groups in the area. This comes in light of practical steps taken to dismantle some key states in the region or weaken their security and military institutions, and to redraw the map of power centers. It is assessed that the likelihood is increasing for some regional/international powers to continue utilizing these groups to advance their plans for reshaping regional security arrangements in their favor. This includes the growing potential for employing ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and some factions opposed to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to drain the security and military strength of the new Syrian administration, and to justify the continued U.S./Israeli military presence in Syria. Additionally, there is a possibility of coordinating the transfer of some ISIS and Al-Qaeda elements/foreign fighters with Turkey to other countries in the region (Libya – Iraq) to further these plans of reordering the situation.



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The Future Impact of the Security Situation in Syria on the Arab Region

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Abstract:

The study clarifies the most important expected repercussions coming from within Syria on the region and on the overall stability/instability in the Arab world, highlighting the extent of the ongoing developments in Syria in directing the course of the security and strategic arrangements planned for the Arab world. It can be confirmed that the Syrian reality is still working in one direction, politically and security-wise, and the current political scene has not changed from what it is, with the assumption of the temporary transitional administration and the appointment of Ahmed al-Sharaa as President of Syria, especially since what is happening in the political arena is actually linked to several important steps that may require further evaluation and review of the results of the National Dialogue Conference, which could be an important political event, as it will prepare for a historic phase in the life of Syria, after the fall of the former regime.

The current and expected Syrian reality will have repercussions on the Arab region, especially with the escalation of the functional role of armed groups in the region, and in light of the practical steps that have been implemented towards eliminating some of the main countries in the region or weakening their security and military institutions, and redrawing the map of power centers in the region with the continued Israeli presence in Syrian territory, which it has penetrated into the southern regions with the possibility of expanding into the occupation of other territories and imposing a fait accompli on the ground in light of the current state of political/security fluidity in the Syrian scene.

Keywords: Syrian revolution, Golan Heights, Kurds, Israel, security situation

التأثير المستقبلي للوضع الأمني في سوريا على المنطقة العربية

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المستخلص :

أوضحت الدراسة أهم الارتدادات المتوقعة والواردة من الداخل السوري على الإقليم وعلى مجمل الاستقرار/ عدم الاستقرار على العالم العربي، وإبراز حجم التطورات الجارية في سوريا على توجيه مسار الترتيبات الأمنية والاستراتيجية التي تخطط للعالم العربي؛ حيث يمكن تأكيد أن الواقع السوري ما زال يعمل في اتجاه واحد سياسياً وأمنياً، ولم يتغير المشهد السياسي الراهن عن ما هو عليه، وتولى الإدارة الانتقالية المؤقتة وتعيين أحمد الشرع رئيساً لسوريا، خاصة أن ما يجري في الساحة السياسية مرتبط فعلياً بعدة خطوات مهمة ربما ستحتاج إلى مزيد من التقييم والمراجعة لنتائج مؤتمر الحوار الوطني الذي يؤكد استحقاقاً سياسياً مهماً، لأنه سيجزى لمرحلة تاريخية في حياة سوريا، بعد سقوط النظام السابق.

سيبقى الواقع السوري الحالي والمتوقع بتبعاته على المنطقة العربية، خاصة مع تصاعد الدور الوظيفي للجماعات المسلحة في المنطقة، وفي ظل ما تم تنفيذه من خطوات عملية نحو القضاء على بعض الدول الرئيسية في المنطقة أو إضعاف مؤسساتها الأمنية والعسكرية، وإعادة ترسيم خريطة مراكز القوى في المنطقة مع استمرار الوجود الإسرائيلي في الأراضي السورية التي توغلت بها في المناطق الجنوبية، مع احتمالات التوسع في احتلال أراضٍ أخرى، وفرض أمر واقع على الأرض في ظل حالة السيولة السياسية/الأمنية الحالية في المشهد السوري.

الكلمات المفتاحية : الثورة السورية، الجولان، الأكراد، إسرائيل، الأوضاع الأمنية.