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The Role of Early Warning
in Conflict Prevention in African Countries

Introduction:

There is no doubt that the African continent has a long history of conflicts and armed disputes related to power struggles, whether in the form of military coups or violence accompanying electoral processes. These have had severe consequences for stability, development, and national security within African countries and the regional security of the continent[1]. Despite the establishment of the African Union's continental early warning system, aimed at anticipating conflicts and disputes to prevent them through monitoring, data collection, and information regarding potential and existing risks and threats, the continent still faces increasing security challenges and escalating conflicts in many countries. Therefore, there is an urgent need to understand how to convert information extracted from early warning systems into tangible and effective actions to prevent violence, improve the predictive capability of early warning systems by enhancing continuity and bridging the gap between monitoring, preparedness, and response, and then activating rapid response measures and undertaking preventive diplomatic actions to mitigate tensions and prevent the escalation of crises on the continent

Research Problem

The issue lies in the existence of conflicts and waves of violence during electoral processes and military coups, which cast a shadow over the peace and national security of countries and the regional security of the continent, hindering development in African countries. Despite the presence of early warning mechanisms within countries and regional organizations such as the African Union and ECOWAS, these mechanisms have succeeded in some countries and failed in others. Therefore, this study seeks to understand the reasons behind the success and failure of early warning mechanisms in application within African countries to develop these mechanisms and prevent conflicts in the future.

Objectives of the Study

1- Utilizing early warning to predict potential conflicts and disputes that, in turn, affect the national security of African countries.

2- Activating the early warning mechanism to inform and alert decision-makers about potential conflicts while they are in the stages of growth and formation.

3- Preparing in advance and finding effective means for early warning to minimize the impacts of conflicts and quickly address them effectively and efficiently.

Research Questions:

The study seeks to answer the following questions:

Main Question:

How effective are early warning systems in the African continent in predicting conflicts and violence in African countries?

Sub-questions:

1- What is the extent of the spread of early warning mechanisms to predict potential conflicts in African countries?

2- How have African countries benefited from early warning mechanisms to prevent conflicts and achieve national security?

3- Why do early warning mechanisms need development?

Research Methodology

Descriptive Method:

The study relies on the descriptive method, through which the dimensions and characteristics of the current state of early warning systems in predicting conflicts and political tensions are identified and objectively described. This is done by using all data and facts with scientific research tools and techniques. This method has been employed to scientifically and objectively describe and analyze its dimensions in light of the study's objectives. The aim is to determine the effectiveness of early warning systems in predicting conflicts and political tensions to achieve national security for countries.

Research Contents:

The study will be addressed through the following sections:

1- The conceptual framework of the study.

2- Early warning mechanisms in the African continent.

3- Study results.

4- Study summary.

First: The Conceptual Framework of the Study:

The Concept of Early Warning:

There have been many efforts to define the concept of early warning, which can be divided into the following approaches:

First Approach: This perspective views the early warning system merely as a preemptive warning mechanism for crises, thus tending to simplify the concept.

Second Approach: Proponents of this view consider early warning as a comprehensive process for preventing conflicts. They see the preventive aspect as just a part of the larger early warning system[2].

Third Approach: This perspective views early warning as a system for collecting and providing data, essentially a comprehensive information system. However, this approach has been criticized. Opponents, including **Howard Adelman**, argue that early warning is not just an information system focused on preventing direct threats but a system concerned with the protection of individuals in a given area. Therefore, it is a system capable of preventing conflicts, disasters, and other threats. Consequently, the early warning system is a process that goes beyond merely collecting and sharing information to include analyzing information and preparing strategic options based on data analysis. From this approach, early warning can be defined as *"a process that includes the collection and analysis or evaluation of information,"* as Howard defined it, an *"institutional structure for forecasting such a process."*

The definition used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (**Development Assistance Committee**) in a 2009 study is that early warning is "a process that alerts decision-makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, and recurrence of violent conflicts; and enhances decision-makers' understanding of the nature and effects of violent conflicts," defining what should be warned about and who should be alerted[3].

David Nyheim's 2015 [4] definition is that "early warning is a valuable tool that predicts conflict trends, alerts communities to risks, informs decision-makers, and provides inputs for formulating response strategies, thereby initiating conflict responses."

However, with the emergence of new security challenges, the underfunded global peace and security framework, and the changing nature of wars, Nyheim argues that focusing on predicting and scenario-planning for the outbreak, escalation, or recurrence of violence neglects the prediction of peace. Therefore, there is a need to focus on *"early warning for peace"* to increase decision-makers' ability to predict opportunities that can achieve peace and seize these opportunities when they arise. Although early warning for peace also involves monitoring and analyzing specific violent

conflicts, it differs from *"early warning for conflict and violence"* in that it consists of:

1- Monitoring the factors that maintain peace.

2- Ongoing local, national, regional, and international responses to promote peace.

3- Key actors involved in making and building peace.

Based on this, two new definitions for early warning are proposed:

First Definition:

Early warning is a process that:

a. Alerts decision-makers and affected populations to the potential outbreak, escalation, and recurrence of violent conflict.

b. Informs and enables local, regional, and international responses to prevent and manage or mitigate the effects of violent conflict.

c. Alerts decision-makers to emerging opportunities for peace and guides strategies and responses to create conditions for lasting peace.

Second Definition:

Early warning is a system that regularly and systematically collects and analyzes information related to violent conflicts and peace opportunities, provides a range of early warning products, and, in some cases, directly responds to violent conflicts with its executive links in the form of response tools and mechanisms[5].

Howard Adelman's definition of early warning emphasized its ability to protect and prevent conflicts and disasters, thus extending beyond merely collecting and sharing information to analyzing it. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's definition focused on enhancing decision-makers' understanding of the nature and effects of violent conflicts, while *David Nyheim's* definition was more comprehensive, focusing on predicting conflict trends, alerting communities to risks, informing decision-makers, and providing inputs for formulating response strategies, thereby initiating conflict responses.

This study adopts a definition of early warning as: *"A tool capable of anticipating crises by assessing the economic, social, political, environmental, and demographic risk profiles of a country, through which overall risks in a particular area are identified for a country to provide appropriate information to policymakers and decision-makers"*[6]

The Concept of Regional Security:

Regional security is a strategic concept aimed at studying the future of states to achieve minimum security for stability. It is characterized by being variable, depending on several complex factors: historical, economic, political, and military. Additionally, it is undefined, as it may be misused by states due to the lack of a framework defining the concept. The constants of national security are the geographical constants related to the state's geographical location, historical constants related to the state's contributions to human civilization, and cultural constants represented in religion, language, nationality, and heritage[7].

Therefore, the concept of regional security encompasses all parties within the regional framework (*the African Union and ECOWAS*) that have mutual and extended interests in finding common solutions to shared issues, rather than merely the sum of national security for each state within that region. This ensures shared interests and equal and balanced rights for all parties.

Second: Early Warning Mechanisms in the African Continent:

1. The African Union:

The African Union is one of the regional organizations that has ensured the presence of early warning mechanisms capable of detecting early signs and signals of conflicts and disputes on the continent to prevent their occurrence. These mechanisms are part of the Union's strategy to maintain peace, stability, and national security in the African continent[8]. Among them are:

a. The Panel of the Wise (POW):

This is one of the African Union's primary mechanisms for conflict prevention in Africa. The panel consists of eminent personalities with extensive experience and exceptional qualifications in promoting peace, security, and development on the continent. They are appointed by the *"Conference of Heads of State and Government of the African Union"* for a three-year term.

The panel's role includes advising the African Union's Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on enhancing and maintaining peace, security, and stability in Africa through preventive diplomacy strategies based on the idea of *"African solutions to African problems,"* inspired by African traditions. The panel emulates

councils held by respected elders to prevent and resolve disputes within African communities. This raises the issue of how compatible it is with the continent's cultural and ethnic diversity and whether it can be considered an African solution simply by being implemented by Africans[9]. The panel's work extends at the regional level through the African Elders Network[10]. More coordination is still needed between the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, and other conflict prevention mechanisms under the auspices of the African Union.

b. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS):

The Continental Early Warning System was established in the declaration of the 1996 meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) ministers. This resulted in support for the proposal by then-Secretary General of the OAU, *Salim Ahmed Salim*, to create an early warning system for the African continent. The proposal was implemented by establishing the early warning system as an entity under the African Peace and Security Council in 2004, one of its essential pillars as outlined in Article 12 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, which defined the legal framework governing the system's operation[11].

In 2009, the African Union Commission adopted the implementation of the operational framework for the Continental Early Warning System, which included the collection and analysis of information and data related to conflicts, issuing early warning reports to facilitate interaction with decision-makers, and coordinating and cooperating with regional economic organizations, civil society organizations, the United Nations, and mobilizing human, financial, and technical resources from African Union member states and other stakeholders[12].

This system is dedicated to predicting conflicts to prevent their occurrence by monitoring and analyzing developments and events across the African continent, relying on various indicators (political, military, economic, humanitarian, and social), and then selecting the best action plans that serve as early responses[13].

c. Election Monitoring Missions:

These missions are responsible for predicting and preventing violence associated with electoral processes. Their mission revolves around monitoring political tensions related to electoral processes, which are often due to economic and social tensions that can threaten political security and stability.

The African Union dispatches exploratory missions through the "Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit" before the electoral process to assess the preparedness of the concerned state to conduct democratic elections. Additionally, African Union member states must invite the election monitoring mission, comply with the African Union Commission's assessment, and provide all necessary facilities for the mission to carry out its monitoring and evaluation tasks objectively, transparently, and fairly, based on the invitation from the concerned state two months before the electoral process begins[14].

2. Experiences of African Countries in Preventing Conflicts with Early Warning Systems:

First: South Sudan:

Although early warning systems in South Sudan have not been able to completely stop the civil wars, they have been effective in influencing the situation towards peace and mitigating conflicts in the country at various times. This is in contrast to the early years of South Sudan's independence, which were marked by violent and comprehensive wars. Over time and with the development of early warning systems, the situation improved significantly, contributing to relative stability even in complex and changing contexts, and reducing the chances of escalating violence and conflicts into full-blown wars[15].

a. Predicting and Preventing a Military Coup:

After the independence of South Sudan, the first general elections were scheduled for July 2015. However, due to the ongoing conflict in the country and the noticeable increasing divisions within the army, the early warning system of the Union and the national early warning system warned of the possibility of a military coup. This conclusion was based on comparisons with the experiences of other African countries that suffered divisions within their armed forces, such as Chad, Mali, and Guinea. Therefore, postponing the general elections was a crucial decision to avoid escalating violence and thwart any coup attempts.

This reflects the ability of early warning systems to predict risks and act proactively to prevent crises from worsening. The system was able to accurately assess the political and security situation and provide appropriate recommendations to ensure the country's stability[16].

b. Predicting and Preventing Political Violence:

The "Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit" (CEWERU) continuously assesses and predicts the state of conflict in the country. It collaborates with regional and international early warning systems managed by the "Intergovernmental Authority on Development" (IGAD) and the "United Nations Mission in South Sudan" to predict violent conflict and develop strategies to prevent it. The efforts of the aforementioned early warning systems resulted in recommendations to the parliament, which in 2015 made amendments to the 2011 Transitional Constitution to extend the presidential term by two years and the legislative term by four years, thereby postponing the presidential elections to avoid violent conflict amid fierce competition for power and civil war, as well as escalating divisions within the armed forces[17].

c. Managing Major Conflicts:

In 2013, the conflict between *President Salva Kiir Mayardit* and the forces of his rival *Riek Machar* was successfully contained due to the intervention of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 2014, IGAD used information from its conflict early warning system, which indicated the necessity of negotiating the "2014 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities," leading to the end of hostilities and opening the door for further negotiations.

This agreement represents a model case of how the early warning system can be used in conflict management, demonstrating the transformation of conflict through early warning systems in South Sudan by reducing violence and hostility through encouraging objectivity in the conflict. The system provided vital information that contributed to the successful negotiations, leading to the cessation of hostilities. It proved capable of analyzing conflict indicators at early stages, allowing the concerned parties to intervene proactively to prevent violence escalation.

It also helped identify critical moments and intervention opportunities, enabling the

achievement of the 2014 cessation of hostilities agreement. The system's role extended beyond information gathering to providing an objective and peaceful approach to conflict resolution, marking a turning point in conflict management in the region. Therefore, the role of the early warning system can be seen as an effective tool in analyzing conflicts and providing the necessary capacity to achieve peaceful solutions[18].

Second: Ivory Coast:

In the 2020 elections in Ivory Coast, the importance of early warning as a tool for achieving political stability and preventing conflicts became evident. Early warning systems were able to detect indicators that the atmosphere preceding the electoral process in Ivory Coast was fraught with risks. The political environment before the elections was charged with tensions and challenges, marked by a decline in democratic momentum compared to the previous cycle, characterized by political exclusion, electoral violence, opposition boycotts, a polarized media environment, misuse of state resources, and human rights violations.

Additionally, *President Alassane Ouattara's* decision to run for a third term, despite his previous promises not to, the rejection of legal challenges against his eligibility, and questions about the neutrality of the electoral management body resulted in the deaths of at least 40 people and affected the conducive atmosphere for conducting the elections, posing a threat to the freedom and fairness of the electoral process.

Undoubtedly, the early measures taken by the African Union were not always effective in preventing conflicts. These measures included quiet diplomacy and several proactive preventive steps to reduce conflict escalation during the elections, including the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and Election Observation Missions (EOMs). In the 2020 elections, the African Union relied on the same soft methods of preventive diplomacy to prevent conflicts, such as joint mediation efforts with regional and international actors before the elections. The African Union, in cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United Nations, and the Council of the Entente, conducted a preventive diplomatic mission in Ivory Coast aimed at "promoting credible, transparent, and peaceful presidential elections." However, they failed in this mission.

From this standpoint, it can be said that the role of early warning in the 2020 elections in Ivory Coast was significant but faced considerable challenges. The effectiveness of these systems requires not only accurate monitoring of indicators but also the ability to intervene quickly and in a coordinated manner to prevent tensions from turning into actual conflict. This indicates the need to enhance operational capacities and effective coordination among concerned parties to maximize the benefits of early warning systems[19].

Third: Mali:

Mali has experienced a series of military coups since its independence from France in 1960, including two consecutive coups in August 2020 and May 2021. This political and security development highlights the significant challenges faced by early warning mechanisms in predicting and preventing crises.

The importance of the early warning system lies in anticipating real or potential threats, including military coups. However, tracking events in Mali reveals that the gap between early monitoring and early response was a major factor in the inability of these mechanisms to prevent the coups.

Regarding the first coup in August 2020, there were pre-existing indicators pointing to the likelihood of political conflict in Mali, considering the unstable security, social, and political conditions such as the government's poor performance, non-compliance with democratic standards, and inability to provide basic services to citizens, alongside the increasing influence of terrorist groups in the country. Despite this, the response to these indicators was delayed, and the early warning system was not effective enough to issue a quick and effective response. The period leading up to the first coup in 2020 saw belated diplomatic efforts, including visits and consultations that were insufficient to resolve the crisis. For example, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan was appointed as a mediator to resolve the crisis between the government and the opposition only a few days before the coup.

Additionally, the efforts made by ECOWAS, such as sending a fact-finding mission and calling for a summit to assess the situation, were not sufficient to address the concerns and demands of the protesters, whose demands included the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta

and the formation of a transitional government. The mediation that focused on forming a consensus government for national unity did not lead to a fundamental solution.

Furthermore, the international and regional reactions to the 2020 military coup, such as the financial sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and the European Union and the travel ban on the military council, were not enough to deter the military leadership from planning a second coup in May 2021. This shows that traditional measures may sometimes be ineffective, highlighting the need for serious reforms in the early warning system.

Regarding the May 2021 coup, it is evident that the early warning system failed in its initial stages to detect the likelihood of a new political conflict, as the early warning system did not show significant effectiveness in predicting the May 2021 coup, despite the transitional period following the first coup being full of political and military skirmishes, which should have been a warning sign. ECOWAS's role from the first coup in 2020 until the second coup in May 2021 was limited to pushing for the return of civilians to power[20].

Fourth: Niger:

In July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup that impacted its national security, highlighting the challenges associated with early warning systems and their ability to predict and prevent coups. This event represents a turning point in evaluating the effectiveness of current early warning strategies, especially in the context of Niger's positive economic and political developments, which made the coup an unexpected event for many. However, a thorough analysis reveals factors and indicators that may have pointed to the possibility of a coup.

In the period leading up to the coup, Niger saw improvements in economic conditions and political stability, creating a sense of security and confidence in the ruling system. However, local factors and internal dynamics played a crucial role in the coup. These included long-standing hidden tensions between **President Mohamed Bazoum and Presidential Guard Commander General Abdourahamane Tiani.** These tensions were known within political circles but seemed to lack sufficient attention or accurate assessment from early warning systems. Additionally, increasing security challenges in Niger, including rising jihadist activity, indicated an unstable environment. Nonetheless, it appears

these factors were not adequately considered in early warning assessments.

Therefore, the early warning systems of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were expected to play a vital role in predicting and preventing security threats as part of diplomatic mechanisms. Despite this, it seems these systems were unable to provide an accurate analysis of the situation in Niger or anticipate the coup[21].

A. Role of the African Union's Early Warning System in Niger:

The African Union's early warning system is supposed to analyze data and indicators related to political and security stability in member states. In the case of Niger, the system should have identified the increasing tensions between President Bazoum and General Tiani as potential indicators of an impending crisis.

The system was also expected to continue its tasks despite President Bazoum's rejection of external interventions and his claims of controlling the situation, given the history of coups in Niger, repeated military involvement in politics, and the ongoing conflict between Bazoum and Tiani, with conflicting interests and mutual distrust. Additionally, there were clear indicators of Tiani's growing influence and his potential to destabilize the political environment through his command of armed military units. Therefore, the early warning system should have continued gathering and analyzing data, providing warnings and recommendations to the African Union for appropriate action.

Thus, the African Union could have acted swiftly in the Niger crisis, with the early warning system guiding the African Union towards preventive diplomatic measures, including mediation attempts and negotiations, to alleviate tensions and prevent the escalation of the crisis[22].

B. Role of ECOWAS Early Warning:

The military coup in Niger in July 2023 presented a significant challenge for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its early warning mechanisms. In light of the events following the coup, which included swift reactions from the African Union and ECOWAS through statements condemning the coup and holding two extraordinary summits to discuss appropriate responses, it is evident that there are major challenges facing early warning and effective response to such crises[23].

Third: Study Results:

Several conclusions can be drawn from this study as follows:

1- African organizations and countries have utilized early warning mechanisms for a significant period to predict potential conflicts and violence associated with elections in order to achieve their national security objectives. Some countries have benefited from these mechanisms, including South Sudan. For instance, the early warning system of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the national early warning system in South Sudan successfully predicted and prevented a military coup before the first general election in July 2015. They also anticipated political violence and prevented its outbreak by recommending to the parliament that the presidential election be postponed to avoid violent conflict and escalating divisions within the armed forces. Additionally, IGAD used its conflict early warning system in 2014 to successfully contain the conflict between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and his rival Riek Machar, leading to the cessation of hostilities and opening the door for further negotiations.

It can be said that the success of the early warning mechanism in South Sudan depended on understanding the causes of the conflict and being well-acquainted with all its factors. The early warning systems identified the root causes of the war and conflict in South Sudan, including the historical ethnic conflict between the Dinka and Nuer, competition over natural resources, particularly oil, capital resources, and political divisions within the military.

Consequently, the early warning systems collected and continuously analyzed relevant information and data both quantitatively and qualitatively, monitoring conflict indicators. This allowed them to gain a better understanding of the situation, enabling them to formulate and provide recommendations to relevant parties, intervene, and respond in a timely manner. The early warning systems had an impact on the conflict parties, leading them to engage in multiple negotiations and sign agreements thanks to the recommendations of these systems, which prevented various forms of violence in South Sudan.

2- The early actions taken by African countries, the African Union, and other organizations

in Africa have not always been effective in preventing conflicts. This indicates a need for further coordination, cooperation, and planning among African Union institutions and other organizations. There is also a need to address the gap in translating information obtained from early warning systems into tangible and effective actions to prevent violence. This involves not only precise monitoring of indicators but also the ability to intervene quickly and in a coordinated manner to prevent tensions from escalating into actual conflict.

Conclusion:

The study concluded that the early warning system is characterized by a set of features that have overshadowed its performance and requires several adjustments to enhance its effectiveness, as follows:

1- There is a need for better coordination, cooperation, and planning between the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise, and between the Panel and other conflict prevention mechanisms under the auspices of the African Union. While the interventions of the Panel of the Wise are effective, they are often perceived as aimed at strengthening political systems at the expense of enhancing democracy and human rights.

2- It is crucial to translate information obtained from early warning systems into concrete and effective actions to prevent violence within the African Union. However, there are flaws in this process, as demonstrated by the prediction of events in Côte d'Ivoire prior to the 2020 elections, where the atmosphere was tense and fraught with indicators of potential violence.

3- Early warning systems need to be activated to increase the capacity for rapid and coordinated intervention to prevent tensions from escalating into actual conflicts. Strengthening operational capabilities and effective coordination among stakeholders is essential to maximize the benefits of early warning systems.

4- The African Union could have acted swiftly in the Niger crisis. Early warning systems should guide the African Union in implementing preventive diplomatic measures, including mediation and negotiations, to alleviate tensions and prevent the escalation of the crisis.

5- Reforms are needed in ECOWAS's early warning system to improve its ability to predict and respond effectively to crises. These reforms should include enhancing continuity and bridging the gap between monitoring, preparedness, and response. The system failed to anticipate or preemptively intervene in the Niger coup, despite clear indicators of political and security tensions. This shortfall in early warning contributed to the worsening of the crisis.

6- Regional organizations such as ECOWAS should reconsider their methods of dealing with crises and explore innovative and unconventional diplomatic means. There is also a need to strengthen early warning systems and immediate response mechanisms in ECOWAS, and to develop more integrated and effective strategies to address coups and other political crises.

In conclusion, while African organizations and countries have had early warning mechanisms for a long time to predict potential conflicts and election-related violence, some countries have benefited from these mechanisms, leading to the containment of conflicts and achievement of national security. However, it is difficult to assert that early warning mechanisms have been effective in all African countries, as some states and organizations have failed, indicating a need for further development of these mechanisms.

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The Role of Early Warning in Conflict Prevention in African Countries

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Abstract:

There is no doubt that the African continent has a great history of conflicts and armed conflicts within it associated with the struggle for power, whether in the form of military coups, or violence associated with electoral processes. This has had serious consequences for stability, development and thus the national security of States on the African continent. Despite the availability of the early warning mechanism in countries and regional organizations such as the African Union and at the local level, it has succeeded in cases such as South Sudan, and failed in other cases, as happened in Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Mali. Therefore, this study seeks to identify the reasons for the success and failure of the early warning mechanism in African countries and how to benefit from early warning in predicting potential conflicts and disputes, which in turn affect the achievement of national security of African countries; the effectiveness of the early warning mechanism to notify the decision-maker of potential conflicts in the process of growth and formation; and preparing in advance, and finding effective means of early warning to reduce the effects of conflicts and deal with them effectively and efficiently.

Keywords: Early warning, African conflicts

دور الإنذار المبكر فى منع الصراعات فى الدول الإفريقية

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وكيل لجنة الشئون الخارجية والعربية والإفريقية بمجلس الشيوخ

مدير وحدة الإنذار المبكر بمركز المعلومات ودعم اتخاذ القرار برئاسة مجلس الوزراء

المستخلص :

مما لاشك فيه أن القارة الإفريقية لها تاريخ كبير من الصراعات والنزاعات المسلحة بداخلها المرتبطة بالصراع على السلطة، سواء كان فى شكل انقلابات عسكرية، أو العنف المصاحب للعمليات الانتخابية، وهو ما كان له عواقبه الوخيمة على الاستقرار وتحقيق التنمية، ومن ثم الأمن القومى للدول فى القارة الإفريقية. ورغم توافر آلية الإنذار المبكر لدى الدول والمنظمات الإقليمية مثل الاتحاد الإفريقى وعلى المستوى المحلى، فإنها نجحت فى حالات مثل دولة جنوب السودان، وأخفقت فى حالات أخرى كما حدث فى كوت ديفوار والنيجر ومالى، ولذا تسعى هذه الدراسة للوقوف على أسباب نجاح وفشل آلية الإنذار المبكر فى الدول الإفريقية وكيفية الاستفادة من الإنذار المبكر فى التنبؤ بالصراعات والنزاعات المحتملة التى تؤثر بدورها على تحقيق الأمن القومى للدول الإفريقية، ومدى فاعلية آلية الإنذار المبكر لإشعار متخذ القرار وإعلامه بالصراعات المحتملة وهى فى طور النمو والتكون، والاستعداد المسبق، وإيجاد الوسائل الفعالة للإنذار المبكر ليعمل على الحد من آثار الصراعات وسرعة التعامل معها بفاعلية وكفاءة.

الكلمات المفتاحية : الإنذار المبكر، الصراعات الإفريقية.